6 February 1967

DCI BRIEFING FOR HOUSE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE

CUBA


Military Situation

- I. Cuba may have dropped out of the headlines in recent months, but I want to assure you that we maintain a close intelligence watch on what the Cubans are up to both at home and in trouble spots around Latin America.
 - A. We are continuing regular photographic reconnaissance.
 - B. A joint intelligence team from CIA and the Defense Intelligence Agency meets regularly, to examine all intelligence from all sources on Cuba. The primary concern of this team is whether there is any evidence of strategic weapons or nuclear warheads on the island.
 - C. The latest report remains negative.

II.	There h	ıas,	however,	been a	subst	antial	increase
	in Sovi	.et m	ilitary	shipment	s to	Cuba.	

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- III. We believe the increased shipments reflect a new military aid agreement reached when Raul Castro was in Moscow last spring. Most of the shipments over the past three years have consisted of replacements, spare parts, maintenance equipment, and ammunition.
 - A. We have observed no major addition to the Cuban military potential.
 - B. The recent shipments have included surfaceto-air missiles to replace the present inventory, which has reached the end of its storage life.
 - C. Recent deliveries—some arriving as deck cargo on otherwise commercial shipments—have included six additional Komar guided missile boats, and five to seven MIG-21 aircraft.

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IV. The Cuban military establishment is one of the largest and best equipped in Latin America. Morale is good—especially among the officers. The troops are loyal to the regime. The armed forces are fully capable of maintaining internal order and defending the island from anything short of a large—scale external assault supported by the United States.

(MAP, CUBAN MILITARY INSTALLATIONS)

- A. Cuban air defense has 23 surface-to-air missile installations, about 135 jet fighters ranging from the MIG-15 to the supersonic MIG-21, and almost 1,500 antiaircraft guns, some of them radar-controlled.
 - 1. You may recall that when the Soviets
 first brought the surface-to-air missile
 batteries to Cuba, they were spread out
 to cover as much of the island as possible.

- 2. The Cubans have now relocated them to give concentrated point defense to critical areas, as the map shows.
- B. The Cubans also have three versions of the same basic surface-to-surface cruise missile.
 - One version is a ground-to-ground tactical missile on a mobile launcher.
 - 2. A second version was deployed on eight launchers at four coastal defense missile sites, but during late 1966, all four sites were vacated. The equipment has been assembled with the ground forces version at a storage facility near Havana.
 - 3. The third version is the weapon of the Komar guided missile patrol boat. Cuba now has 18 of these boats, There is speculation that the six additional boats were meant to take the place of the fixed and outdated coastal defense system.

Foreign Policy

V. Fidel Castro and other Cuban leaders are talking and taking a hard line on revolution elsewhere in Latin America.

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- A. The old Havana agreement, to work through orthodox Communist parties rather than more militant groups, apparently no longer binds Castro.
- B. In Venezuela, Cuban funds, training, and propaganda support—and probably weapons as well—are going to the dissident militants led by Douglas Bravo. The orthodox Communists are without funds, and disorganized.
- C. In Guatemala, the Communist guerrillas have been receiving arms smuggled through Mexico with the assistance of Cuban diplomats. We have a report that additional shipments are expected by sea.
- D. In Colombia, a guerrilla movement sponsored, financed, and trained by Cuba has begun operations in an area which has been relatively free from the depradations of the pro-Communist bandit gangs.
- VI. Castro has shown a certain amount of independence abroad in his support of militant guerrilla splinter groups, and at home by cracking down on some of the veteran Communists in his government, but he remains on good terms with Moscow.

A. The Soviet Union has continued its largescale economic support of Cuba. It helped Castro offset the economic impact of last year's poor sugar crop,

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- B. As for Communist China, Castro has been exchanging public insults with the Peking leaders for almost a year now, ever since the Chinese cut back on planned rice deliveries. The coolness is expected to stop short of a complete diplomatic break.
- C. There are indications of some limited Cuban manpower in North Vietnam, largely symbolic.

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D. There is a large Cuban training mission in Brazzaville Congo, and Cuban instructors at one time worked with the rebel forces in the other Congo.

Domestic Situation

- VII. At home, Fidel Castro remains firmly in control.
 - A. His power position is based on tight security controls, and on the loyalty of key military officers and security officials.

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В.	There were	some repor	rts earl	ly in 196	66 that
	Castro was	ill or sli	pping,	because	he was
	not making	his usual	public	appearar	nces.
	Since June,	however,	he has	been as	active
	as ever.				

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- VIII. The economic situation is still Castro's biggest problem.
 - A. Troubles arising from mismanagement, inefficiency, and low labor productivity have been aggravated by a series of natural disasters--mainly hurricanes.
 - 1. Some of the recent Caribbean hurricanes have been taking not just one,
 but two or three cuts at Cuba.
 - 2. The missing Che Guevara, put too much influence on industrial expansion.
 - 3. Now the main emphasis is back on sugar production, and a series of reorganizations and personnel shakeups is improving management.

II-93

- B. The 1966 sugar harvest, at four and a half million tons, was two million tons below the planned goal, principally because of the drought.
 - 1. In 1967, however, barring adverse weather Cuba should have one of its best sugar harvests in history--probably between 6 and 7 million tons.
- C. Nevertheless, per capita income will remain below the pre-Castro levels.
 - 1. Basic foods are still rationed, and food distribution is poor.
- D. Castro's bellicose foreign policy actions and statements of the past six months probably reflect frustration over the continuing critical economic and administrative problems.